Abstract-Integer overflows have threatened software applications for decades. Thus, in this paper, we propose a novel technique to provide automatic repair of integer overflows in C source code. Our technique, based on static symbolic execution, fuses detection, repair generation and validation. This technique is implemented in a prototype named INTREPAIR. We applied INTREPAIR to 2,052 C programs (approx. 1 million lines of code) contained in SAMATE's Juliet test suite and 50 synthesized programs that range up to 20 KLOC. Our experimental results show that INTREPAIR is able to effectively detect integer overflows and successfully repair them, while only increasing the source code (LOC) and binary (Kb) size by around 1%, respectively. Furthermore, we present the results of a user study with 30 participants showing that INTREPAIR repairs are more efficient than manual repairs.
INTRODUCTION
Integer overflows are a well-known cause of memory corruptions, and a widely known type of vulnerability [52] that has threatened programs for decades. To address this challenge, it has been, for example, proposed to apply the concept of automatic repair [38] to fix integer overflows. This idea consists of employing a system that produces code patches in order to fix integer overflows. In the past, important milestones [24] , [45] , [47] towards automatic repair of integer overflows have been reached: SoupInt [50] is a runtime-based binary patch generator, CodePhage [47] is a code transfer system at the binary level, and Sift [24] is a static input filter generator which needs access to the source code and binary code of the repaired program. However, these integer overflow repair tools either: (1) introduce a high runtime overhead after the program was repaired, or (2) do not validate whether the generated patches are correct and program behavior is not changed in an unwanted manner.
In this paper, we tackle these two problems in a novel system, INTREPAIR, usable for automatic repair of integer overflows. Our key idea is to use symbolic execution [1] , [4] , [5] , [25] , [51] to reason about the repair. In particular, our intuition is two-fold: (1) we fuse the fault localization and repair generation phases into a single algorithm via SMT solving, and (2) we ensure that the resulting repairs do not insert unwanted program behavior with symbolic reasoning. We present a novel integer overflow repair technique that operationalizes this idea and the corresponding prototype tool, INTREPAIR. To the best of our knowledge, INTREPAIR is the first approach for automated repair of integer overflow that does not require test cases.
Given a buggy program, INTREPAIR generates a SMT system that captures integer overflow manifestation and allows for correct patch generation and validation. This is achieved by interweaving the bug detection SMT constraints with newly synthesized constraints used for correct bug generation. Patch Correctness: The repairs generated by INTREPAIR are correct in the sense that the repair correctly removes the bug and does not change program behavior. Patch Validation: By validation, we mean that the generated synthesized patches are guaranteed to be correct. As such:
(1) the automatically generated patches are not program input dependent, (2) the generated patch removes the detected integer overflow on all program execution paths that reach the fault location, and (3) the patches do not introduce unwanted program behavior (i.e., only the integer overflow is removed). The integer overflow detection checker on which INTREPAIR relies does not generate false negatives (i.e., every detected integer overflow is a genuine integer overflow). Further, we do not distinguish between intended or unintended integer overflows, yet false positives may happen due to certain implementation limitations, such as loop unrolling or recursion depth.
The implementation of INTREPAIR is built upon the Codan static symbolic execution engine [21] , [22] , [40] . It uses the Z3 SMT solver [12] to solve the extracted constraints. Note, that our repair generation technique is general enough to be implemented on top of other symbolic execution engines as well.
We evaluated INTREPAIR on 2,052 C programs contained in the SAMATE's C/C++ benchmark suite [49] , totaling more than one million lines of code (LOC). The evaluated programs contain all possible program control flows that may lead to an integer overflow. Further, we use a synthesized benchmark containing 50 large C programs (up to 20 KLOC) seeded with integer overflows. Our experimental results show that INTREPAIR is able to: (1) effectively detect all integer overflows, and (2) successfully repair the programs at the source code level. In addition, we present the results of a user study with 30 participants showing that INTREPAIR is effective compared to traditional manual repair. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other open source tools with which we can compare against. In particular, DirectFix [26] , Angelix [27] , or SemFix [42] are not suitable for comparison purposes as these tools use test cases to locate the fault: on the contrary, we do not assume the presence of test cases.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Novel Integer Overflow Repair Technique. We designed a novel source code repair generation technique for integer overflows in C programs.
• Repair Tool. We implemented INTREPAIR, as a prototype of our novel integer overflow repairing technique, for C source code programs. It can be automatically used to repair integer overflows across multiple integer precisions.
• Quantitative Evaluation. We evaluated INTREPAIR thoroughly with 2,052 C programs contained in the currently largest open-source test suite for C/C++ source code (NSA's Juliet) and with 50 synthesized programs which range up to 20 KLOC. We show that INTREPAIR's code repairs are effective and induce low runtime overhead.
• Controlled Experiment. We evaluated INTREPAIR within a controlled experiment with 30 participants and determined that our tool is more time-effective than repairing the same programs manually.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the required background knowledge needed in order to understand the rest of this paper. In Section 3, we highlight design and implementation details of INTREPAIR, while In Section 4, we evaluate INTREPAIR, and in Section 5, we discuss limitations of INTREPAIR. In Section 6, we review related work, and in Section 7, we offer concluding remarks.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Before presenting the technical details of our approach, we highlight the necessary background information required to better understand the rest of the paper.
Integer Overflows
Integer overflow is a known cause of memory corruption and a widely known type of vulnerability [52] . It often leads to stack or heap overflow and thus is usually exploited indirectly (as opposed to buffer overflows which are exploited directly). More specifically, integer overflows occur at runtime, when the result of an integer expression exceeds the maximum allowed value (e.g., 2
32 − 1).
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Characteristics of Integer Overflows
Integer overflows can be classified as malicious or benign. Essentially, an integer overflow manifests itself, when the program receives user-supplied input and subsequently the input value is used in an arithmetic operation to trigger an integer overflow. Thus, a smaller than expected value is supplied to the memory allocation function and as a result a smaller than expected memory will be allocated. Deciding between the types of integer overflow related problems is rather difficult and a lot of research has been devoted in the last years to this type of classification [48] . The general desire in the research community is to categorize different hard to find integer overflows w.r.t. how exploit-prone these are in contrast to just finding and repairing them.
Integer Overflow Related Problems
There are several integer overflow related problems that we will next list and briefly describe. CWE-191, integer underflow (wrap or wrap-around) [30] , is the result of multiplying two values with each other and the result is less than the minimum admissible integer value due to the fact that the product subtracts one value from another. CWE-192, integer coercion error [29] , manifests during bad type casting and extension or truncation of primitive data types. CWE-193, off-by-one error [33] , manifests during product calculation/usage; an incorrect maximum/minimum value is used which is one more, or one less, than the correct value. CWE-194, unexpected sign extension [35] , appears when an operation performed on a number can cause it to be sign-extended when it is transformed into a larger data type. CWE-195, signed to unsigned conversion error [34] , manifests when a signed primitive that is used inside a cast to an unsigned primitive can produce an unexpected result if the value of the signed primitive cannot be represented using an unsigned primitive. CWE-196, unsigned to signed conversion error [36] , manifests when an unsigned is used inside a cast to a signed primitive, which can produce an unexpected value if the result of the unsigned primitive cannot be represented using a signed primitive. CWE-197, numeric truncation error [32] , manifests when a primitive is casted to a primitive of a smaller size and data is lost in the conversion. CWE-680, integer overflow to buffer overflow [31] , appears when an integer overflow occurs that causes less memory to be allocated than expected, which can lead to a buffer overflow.
Symbolic Execution Engine
This paper uses a symbolic execution approach for fault detection and repair generation. A symbolic execution engine [40] , [41] constructs a control flow graph (CFG) for each analyzed program and extracts execution paths. Constraints along the execution path are encoded into SMT equations, using the SMT-LIB format SMT-LIB [2] . The translation of CFG nodes into SMT is performed by a translator algorithm, which extends the program's abstract syntax tree (AST) visitor class, according to the visitor pattern [18] . This is usually based on a bottom-up traversal of each program statement located on the currently analyzed program execution path.
In our work, we use the Codan static symbolic execution engine [21] , [22] , [40] . In Codan, single static assignment (SSA) variables are created for C expressions, which are associated with no variables in the analyzed program. Before creating a new variable, the interpreter checks whether there is already a symbolic variable. Further, for all SMT formulas created for a particular program statement, one symbolic variable is created for each of the variables contained in the original program statement. Next, a single path is extracted from the previously computed CFG and traversed. In Codan: (1) loops can be traversed a configurable number of times, (2) the analysis can be customized to look, for example, for the first N faults located on the currently analyzed program path, and (3) Codan performs pathcaching and backtracking traversal, which avoids traversing the whole program path from the beginning and collecting all constraints again. Codan uses the Z3 [12] solver as its backend in order to solve SMT constraints.
INTREPAIR: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In Section 3.1, we present the architecture of INTREPAIR, and in Section 3.2, we present the supported overflow and underflow checks, while in Section 3.3, we introduce INTREPAIR's fault localization algorithm. In Section 3.4, we depict several of the repair patterns of INTREPAIR, and in Section 3.5, we present the repair generation algorithm, while in Section 3.6, we highlight implementation details. Finally, in Section 3.7, we describe how INTREPAIR was integrated and can be used inside an IDE. Initially, the 1 source code is passed into the 2 symbolic execution engine, which first constructs a CFG and then extracts all program execution paths. Constraints are collected along these paths and 3 the integer overflow detection component identifies whether an integer overflow might occur for a given execution path. In 4 a repair pattern is selected to fix the overflow. The 5 symbolic repair validation component checks whether the negated constraints invalidate this integer overflow error. If this is the case, 6 the validated integer overflow repair is validated and a 7 targeted automatic repair is generated that removes the previously detected integer overflow. After applying the repair, we obtain the 8 patched source code, which is again validated through 9 re-factored code validation. Further, in case 3 integer overflow detection does not find an overflow, INTREPAIR produces 10 a removed overflow, indicating that the bug was successfully removed and 11 repaired source code has been synthesized. Finally, in case the integer overflow was not removed, then INTREPAIR produces 12 an unremoved overflow, and the result is 13 unrepaired source code. Note, that INTREPAIR checks for the introduction of unwanted behavior after a patch was inserted by re-analyzing the program with the help of symbolic execution and deciding that no new bug was inserted. For verifying a patch after it was applied, INTREPAIR does not require any test case since the integer overflow component can decide if the bug was removed. However, a test case can be used in conjunction with the fault detection component in order to confirm that the bug was removed from the source code location where it was first detected before patching.
Overview

IntRepair Overflow and Underflow Checks
In the following, we present the three types of overflow and underflow checks that are supported by INTREPAIR. The checks are preconditions, as shown below. If one of the preconditions evaluates to true, then an integer overflow has been found [13] .
First precondition. The addition of two integers, in which one is a variable and the other is a positive constant, will lead to an integer overflow if the following expression evaluates to true:
Second precondition. The multiplication of two integers, in which one is a variable and the other is negative, will lead to an integer overflow or underflow if the following expression evaluates to true:
Note that s 2 is the negative constant.
Third precondition. The multiplication of two equal integers will lead to an integer overflow or underflow if the following expression evaluates to true:
). Note that s 1 and s 2 are the same variable.
The above preconditions are used over multiple types of inputs for s 1 or s 2 (i.e., RAND32(), this is the wrapper for the C random function, fscanf() etc.). The preconditions can be applied over multiple integer precisions, meaning that INT_MAX can take different values depending on the currently used integer precision in the analyzed program. We call this value the maximum admissible upper bound value of an integer. This value is determined automatically during program analysis. Further, the variables s 1 or s 2 can take different types: char, int64_t, int, short, unsigned int. In contrast to IOC's preconditions, which aim to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow during program runtime, our preconditions help to guide repairs at the right code location, where the integer overflow was detected and confirmed. This results in avoiding the bug during runtime. Note that we always use symbolic execution again as a last step to confirm that the bug was completely fixed after a repair was inserted.
Other operations, which may lead to integer overflows, are: truncation, bit shifts and subtraction operations (see Figure 6 in Pereira et al. [43] for more details). Currently, INTREPAIR does not support these operations, but we plan to support them in an updated version of INTREPAIR.
Fault Localization
In order to generate code repairs, INTREPAIR initially needs to detect the precise location where the integer overflow resides in the program. This is the goal of INTREPAIR's repair location search algorithm, which we now present. First, INTREPAIR constructs the CFG of the analyzed program. Next, the following steps are performed consecutively in order to detect a fault.
(1) Each program execution path is extracted from the previously generated program CFG.
(2) The extracted path is traversed and path satisfiability checks are performed at branch nodes.
(3) When INTREPAIR encounters an integer error prone code location (i.e., assignment statement) on the analyzed path, an integer overflow check is performed by notifying the interpreter.
(4) The notification is delegated to the appropriate checker (i.e., integer overflow checker) by the interpreter.
(5) The slice of SMT equations of the symbolic variable, which potentially may overflow, together with corresponding integer overflow satisfiability checks is queried by the integer overflow checker.
(6) The check verifies if the symbolic variable, which caused the integer overflow, can be greater (i.e., if this is true then there is an integer overflow) than the currently used integer upper bound value (i.e., INT_MAX). These upper bound values are extracted from the C standard library contained in the limits.h file. The lower bound is obtained by negating the currently used upper bound value and and adding one to the result.
(7) In case the SMT solver replies SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow bug present) to the previously submitted SMT query, then a problem report with problem ID (unique system string, the ID refers to which checker detected the bug), the file name where the bug was detected, and the line number in the file where the bug is located will be created and stored.
Repair Patterns
In this section, we present the repair patterns available in INTREPAIR. We explain how these patterns can help to repair integer overflows and how the patterns can produce correct fixes. Repair patterns are stored in a decision tree. Note that next we use a decision tree to depict the criteria needed for choosing a repair pattern. Such a decision tree is previously, before the bug repair analysis is started, manually constructed by the programmer and stored in a tree data structure for later usage. The rationale behind the decision tree is to help INTREPAIR to perform an time efficient search for each detected fault and to pick a core repair that fits best. Figure 3 depicts a decision tree used to show repair patterns available to INTREPAIR. The series of dots indicate other operations (i.e., subtraction, bit shift, etc.) or arrows not depicted in this figure due to page constraints. Other repair patterns for int64_t, int, short, and unsigned int types are not depicted due to space limitations. C1 up to C24 represent the criteria needed by INTREPAIR for choosing a repair pattern. A repair is selected when at least two criteria are met. The six arrows on the left bottom pointing up depict six repair patterns determined between C1 and one of the criteria from C7 − C12. Depending on whether one of the components of the analyzed statement type x = y operator z; is a constant, a variable or a variable with side effects (e.g., int z = i++; or short y = foo();) a different repair pattern will be proposed. More specifically, from top to bottom, the decision tree contains an addition (left node) and a multiplication (right node) operation that are used to determine the kind of operation, which is performed in the buggy statement. At the next level in the tree (top to bottom), the type of result variable is determined. Further, at the next level in the tree, it is determined if the parameters of the analyzed statement are constants, variables or have side effects. Figure 3 depicts in total 360 repair patterns (360 possibilities to combine two criteria from the range C1 to C12 with each other, e.g., C1 and C8, see corresponding arrow in Figure 3 ) multiplied by five (data types) and the result is then multiplied by two, two main tree branches, e.g., add and multiply) for the C statement type x = y operand z;.
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Repair Patterns
In this section, we present the repair patterns available in INTREPAIR. We explain how these patterns can help to repair integer overflows and how the patterns can produce correct fixes. Repair patterns are stored in a decision tree. Note that next we use a decision tree to depict the criteria needed for choosing a repair pattern. Such a decision tree is previously, before the bug repair analysis is started, manually constructed by the programmer and stored in a tree data structure for later usage. The rationale behind the decision tree is to help INTREPAIR to perform an time efficient search for each detected fault and to pick a core repair that fits best. Figure 3 choosing a repair pattern. A repair is selected when at least two criteria are met. The six arrows on the left bottom pointing up depict six repair patterns determined between C1 and one of the criteria from C7 − C12. Depending on whether one of the components of the analyzed statement type x = y operator z; is a constant, a variable or a variable with side effects (e.g., int z = i++; or short y = foo();) a different repair pattern will be proposed. More specifically, from top to bottom, the decision tree contains an addition (left node) and a multiplication (right node) operation that are used to determine the kind of operation, which is performed in the buggy statement. At the next level in the tree (top to bottom), the type of result variable is determined. Further, at the next level in the tree, it is determined if the parameters of the analyzed statement are constants, variables or have side effects. Figure 3 depicts in total 360 repair patterns (360 possibilities to combine two criteria from the range C1 to C12 with each other, e.g., C1 and C8, see corresponding arrow in Figure 3 ) multiplied by five (data types) and the result is then multiplied by two, two main tree branches, e.g., add and multiply) for the C statement type x = y operand z;. Table 1 depicts four notable repair patterns in more detail. Note that for space reasons we omit the contents of the if and else branches. The if branch contains the code to log the occurrence of an integer overflow or the code which terminates the execution of the program 1 . The else branch contains a statement where the integer overflow was detected.
Consider the C statement 544. a = b * b; where an integer overflow was detected at line number 544 in a 1 . Note that terminating the program is an option that is not safe in critical program executions, i.e., in case monetary transactions depend on the program execution or when the program is driving a train, etc. The else branch contains a statement where the integer overflow was detected.
1. Note that terminating the program is an option that is not safe in critical program executions, i.e., in case monetary transactions depend on the program execution or when the program is driving a train, etc.
Consider the C statement 544. a = b * b; where an integer overflow was detected at line number 544 in a program's source code file. In this case, the pattern depicted in Figure 4 on row one (C15 & C19) will be used to avoid the bug. This pattern will be selected based on the fact that two equal variables are multiplied. As a result, the statement will be surrounded with the code of the pattern in which parts are replaced based on the type of statement, 543. if (a <= sqrt(IN T _M AX) || a < −sqrt(IN T _M AX)){545. log_or_die(); }546. else{ a = b * b; }. Note that the numbers (i.e., 543 up to 546) used in this example represent the source code line numbers of the repaired program, respectively.
How does a repair help to fix a bug? A generated repair helps to fix a fault by providing to the programmer a finished repair that contains complex mathematical constraints, which are not always obvious.
Why are the produced repairs correct? A produced repair is correct w.r.t. to the definition of repair correctness given in the Section 1, since after the repair generation and insertion INTREPAIR checks if the fault was correctly removed and if the program behavior was changed. Additionally, after repair insertion, the whole program together with the repair is recompiled; thus, semantic errors potentially caused by the patch are in this way excluded.
Finally, note that building a repair is not straightforward, as the construction relies on complex mathematical constraints that need to be inferred based on the currently detected fault. Next, these constrains need to be carefully plugged into each repair pattern in order to provide the final patch.
Integer Overflow Repair Algorithm
The automated repair generation algorithm of INTREPAIR consists of the following steps. 1) Determine the integer upper bound value; 2) Generate a SMT constraint system; 3) Select constraint values; 4) Re-compute the bound checking constraints; 5) Determine the bug type; 6) Select the repair pattern; 7) Determine the new constraint SMT system; 8) Generate code repair;
The algorithm corresponds to the box depicted in Figure 2 . These eight steps are performed in consecutive order as highlighted next in the paper.
Determine Integer Upper Bound Value
In order to determine the currently used integer upper bound value in the analyzed program, INTREPAIR performs the following procedure, which allows INTREPAIR to be a multi-precision tool in the sense that it automatically determines the integer precision needed for each analyzed program. First, INTREPAIR retrieves the hardware overflow limits 2 for each integer type. Second, during the symbolic execution-based traversal of the analyzed program path, INTREPAIR searches for previously defined and used integer 2. e.g., by parsing /usr/include/limits.h on Linux OS.
path with one of the supported integer upper bound values (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_-MAX, SHORT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such an upper bound value is found, it will be set to be the currently used integer upper bound value. INTREPAIR can automatically detect for each environment (system), in which it runs, the currently used integer overflow upper bound limit (i.e., INT_MAX) value. This way, the integer precision is determined for each analyzed program individually. Next, this upper bound value will be used for validating generated candidate code repairs and also to search for integer overflows.
Generate a SMT Constraint System
Next, the symbolic variables and the constraints used inside the integer overflow checker are grouped together and stored for later processing. In particular, INTREPAIR stores: (1) the statement where an integer overflow is detected, (2) the SMT formula used to detect the bug in the first place, (3) the bug ID of the integer overflow checker which was used to detect the bug, (4) the symbolic variable which was used to detect the integer overflow, and (5) other symbolic variables on which the integer overflow triggering variable may depend.
For instance, let us consider a C language assignment statement int result = varA + varB; and its SMT counterpart (assert (=resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic))). The C assignment statement depicts the addition of two variables and the result is stored in a third variable, with a potential integer overflow bug. For this statement, the information collected by INTREPAIR is: (1) int result = varA + varB;, (2) ... (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic varBsymbolic))); ... checksat, note that this SMT constraint represents a part of the SMT system used to detect the bug, (3) ID-Integer_Overflow_Bug, (4) resSymbolic, and (5) and the varAsymbolic variable.
Select Constraint Values
INTREPAIR selects the relevant SMT constraint variables based on the type of C language statement where the integer overflow is detected. For example, consider assignment x = a1 + a2; where the variable x and potentially the variables a1 and a2 need to be taken into consideration, because these influence the occurrence of the integer overflow directly.
The symbolic variable, i.e., resSymbolic, was selected by INTREPAIR to be further constrained. This is done in order to check if the code repair that will be generated could remove the previously detected integer overflow bug. For bug removal checking, the whole SMT constraint system slice of this symbolic variable will be used. Note that this constraint system was previously (before running the bug removal analysis) determined during fault localization. More specifically, this variable will overflow in case of using too large values that cannot properly be stored in the result variable. Note that depending on the complexity of the analyzed statement, more or fewer variables can be taken into consideration in order to determine if the previously detected integer overflow would further manifest after reconstraining. This depends on how the selected symbolic variables were re-constrained. The intuition is that the integer overflow can be detected before a certain variable will overflow. This type of behavior is useful when generating repairs that are constraining more than one program variable. Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next step when re-constraining the bounds during the checking of SMT constraints of the SMT system. Note that this SMT system was used upfront to detect the integer overflow.
Re-Compute the Bound Checking Constraints
In order to solve the problem of determining a suitable variable range for avoiding an overflow, INTREPAIR applies a specific technique for re-constraining the symbolic variable which has overflown and which was selected in the previous step. The variable can be re-constrained after collecting the program execution path constraints for a single program execution path, which were used to check for the presence of an integer overflow. The presence of an integer overflow bug is indicated if for the selected SMT system the Z3 solver reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow bug present).
INTREPAIR re-constraints (for example, through integer upper bound negation) the variable(s) selected from the previous step in order to determine a potentially safe interval which will not lead to a second integer overflow of the symbolic variable. Note that other iterative techniques are possible (i.e., iterating backwards through a vector (from large to small values) of consecutive large values and checking by selecting each value once as integer upper bound if the check conditions will hold). The goal is to determine if there is a second integer overflow if INTREPAIR re-constraints the selected variables as mentioned above. For this purpose, INTREPAIR will check in the next step if for the new SMT constraint system it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable, no integer overflow bug present) solver reply. The new constrained SMT will be composed of the old SMT constraint system, which was used to detect the integer overflow, complemented with the re-constrained SMT equations. If INTREPAIR gets an UNSAT solver reply, then it determines that there will be no integer overflow if it re-constraints the selected variable(s) with the new constraints (e.g., variable range negation, etc.) and as such the integer overflow can be avoided. Finally, the information collected at this step will be used in later steps.
Determine the Bug Type
For a unique detected overflow, INTREPAIR attributes a report containing a unique bug identifier. Based on the generated bug identifier (ID), INTREPAIR can determine which bug type it currently deals with. This information is extracted from data stored during step two. With this ID, INTREPAIR checks in the list of currently supported checkers to which checker this stored information belongs to and determines which repair patterns can be used to repair the previously detected bug. In this way, repair patterns usable for other types of bugs will not be suggested when repairing integer overflows.
Selecting Repair Pattern
Based on the previously determined bug identifier (ID), INT-REPAIR selects the suitable repairs for this integer overflow from the pool of repair patterns using the decision tree (see Figure 3 for more details), as discussed next.
Pattern. The repair patterns of INTREPAIR need to address the following challenges. Each pattern needs to incorporate complex conditions with multiple branches depending on the type of potentially overflowing code location. An INTREPAIR pattern needs to be pre-classifiable for typical code locations (i.e., statements) where it would best apply depending on the AST of the buggy statement(s). Further, each pattern needs to have at least two branches: (1) in the case the check succeeds, and (2) in case the check does not succeed for error logging. The pattern needs to have several customizable components which can be altered during static analysis with: context dependent values, mathematical functions, or C functions extracted from the buggy statement. As such, INTREPAIR's repair patterns need to be nontrivial fragments of incomplete code, which have to be versatile and applicable to different integer overflow repair scenarios.
Patching. The repair patterns impose the following challenges on INTREPAIR's patching process. After the programmer/developer selects a repair pattern, the automated repair mechanism of INTREPAIR needs to be able (1) to extract the components of the buggy statement such as variables, functions (i.e., malloc, etc.) and reuse them for augmenting the selected pattern; to achieve this, the patching mechanism needs to be able to match these extracted components with the parts of the pattern where these fit, (2) next, the patching mechanism needs to be able to precisely incorporate the buggy statement(s) inside the newly selected pattern, (3) the patching mechanism needs to be able to precisely delete the previous statement(s) where the bug was detected and to rewrite the existing source file with the newly generated repair pattern at the correct source code location. As a consequence, the challenges imposed by the repair patterns and INTREPAIR's patching process are nontrivial and require high precision during source code file rewriting.
Repair Pattern Description. INTREPAIR's repair patterns consist of C code skeletons where different repair parts will be replaced with: (1) concrete values after their values have been computed, (2) mathematical operations (e.g., division by a value, etc.), and (3) standard C library functions. Depending on the context, placeholder variables will be replaced with corresponding mathematical functions such as the square root function sqrt or other functions. In the situation in which a mathematical function is used, INT-REPAIR does not need to compute the value of the function upfront (during static analysis) but rather leave this to be computed later during symbolic execution analysis (repair validation) or program runtime. This offers the advantage that INTREPAIR does not need to be able to compute any possible mathematical function.
Further, the code repair patterns used by INTREPAIR are based on preconditions similar to IOC's [14] checks (see Section 3.2 for more details). These preconditions can cover different types of mathematical operations such as multiplication of numbers and addition of variables. At the same time, the repair patterns are highly configurable and versatile. For example, the programmer can easily change, if needed, the error handling function inside the repair pattern or can extend the precondition such that it captures more complex bug avoiding preconditions. This can be achieved by modifying a few lines of code inside an existing pattern or by creating a new pattern and defining the conditions (i.e., depending on the structure of the AST of the statement where the bug was detected) when such a pattern fits best.
Selecting Repair Patterns. For the sake of brevity, we will describe the steps used for selecting a code repair based on a C statement having three components, leftHandSide, rightHandSide, and operator. However, INTREPAIR can deal with more complex statements as well, see Figure 3 for more details.
INTREPAIR follows the following steps to select a suitable repair pattern. First, the code statement where the integer overflow error was detected is divided into its components based on its AST. For example the AST components of a C statement such as int result = varA + varB; are leftHandSide=varA, operator=+ and rightHandSide=varB. Second, a series of rules are checked against the AST of the previous C statement as follows: (1) is leftHandSide equal/different than rightHandSide, (2) what type of operator do we have in the statement, and (3) how many components does the statement have after the = sign, and so on. Third, based on these rules the repair pattern which satisfies the highest number of constraints will be selected. Note that each repair pattern has a list of properties (i.e., use when rightHandSide = leftHandSide and operator = +, etc.) attached to it that are checked against the above stated rules. This list of properties is statically defined when the repair patterns were manually added to the pool of available repairs inside INTREPAIR. Further, in case there are more repair patterns that fulfill the same number of rules, INTREPAIR selects the first repair pattern occurring in the list. In case INTREPAIR cannot determine the pattern selection criteria due to, for example, a complex C language statement, then no repair will be proposed.
Finally, note that if needed this approach can be updated such that all legitimate repair patterns will be proposed and for each a repair can be generated, and selected with a human-in-the-loop approach.
Repair Pattern Example. In the following, we present a repair pattern used by INTREPAIR. needed, the error handling function inside the repair pattern or can extend the precondition such that it captures more complex bug avoiding preconditions. This can be achieved by modifying a few lines of code inside an existing pattern or by creating a new pattern and defining the conditions (i.e., depending on the structure of the AST of the statement where the bug was detected) when such a pattern fits best.
Repair Pattern Example. In the following, we present a repair pattern used by INTREPAIR. -sqrt("+ rightHandSide+") >= -sqrt("+value5 +")) 7 "+"{"+"\n"+"\t"+"\t"+"\t" will be replaced with concrete variables names, values or mathematical functions depending on the type (depending on its AST structure) of code statement containing the bug. For example, the repair pattern depicted in Figure 4 will be used by INTREPAIR when the leftHandSide equals (i.e., string wise comparison) with the rightHandSide and the operator equals (i.e., string wise comparison) to the product operator * . After these checks have been performed, the repair will be assembled as follows.
First, value4, value5 and buggyStm10 located at lines 5, 8, and 10 in Figure 4 , are replaced with: (1) the squared root of the currently selected integer upper bound value value4 ← sqrt(2147483647), (2) the negated integer upper bound value value5 ← -sqrt(2147483647), and (3) the program code statement that contains the previously detected integer overflow error buggyStm10 ← int result = data * data;. Second, the variables FileName, IO_bug and LineNumber located at lines 15-16 in Figure 4 are replaced with concrete values obtained during bug detection. Finally, note that: (1) other code repair patterns can be selected and used based on the format of the AST of the program buggy statement, (2) our technique can be easily generalized to more complex C code statements than the ones mentioned herein, and (3) each generated repair can easily be customized to fit to different types of integer overflow mitigation scenarios, i.e., error logging, etc.
Determine New Constraint System
In this step, INTREPAIR assembles the new SMT constraint system which is used to determine if the previously detected integer overflow is still present. During this step, INTREPAIR takes the constraints determined at the previous step and inserts them in the SMT constraint system which was used to detect the integer overflow. Before inserting the new constraints in the SMT system, INTREPAIR needs to remove the original SMT constraints which were used to detect the presence of the integer overflow. The decision which SMT constraints have to be removed from the SMT system (used to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based on the modular aggregation of these SMT statements inside the integer overflow checker in which these constraints are put together. More precisely, since the SMT constraints used to check for an integer overflow are added in the integer overflow checker in an incremental manner, INT-REPAIR can precisely determine which constraints can be safely removed and replaced with new ones determined at the previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed into the Z3 solver. In case the solver replies SAT, then the constraints added represent valid constraints which can be used to avoid the previously detected integer overflow. This new SMT constraint system serves as ground truth w.r.t. the fact that the integer overflow can be removed if certain symbolic variables are re-constrained in an appropriate way. Finally, note that the above-described symbolic variables have concrete counterparts values, which will be inserted inside the code repair when assembling it.
Generate Code Repair
This step consists of putting together the final code repair(s) and saving them into a list in case multiple repairs are suggested. After the repair components have been inserted repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (shaded in red color) interleaved with several stub variables which will be replaced with concrete variables names, values or mathematical functions depending on the type (depending on its AST structure) of code statement containing the bug. For example, the repair pattern depicted in Figure 5 will be used by INTREPAIR when the leftHandSide equals (i.e., string wise comparison) with the rightHandSide and the operator equals (i.e., string wise comparison) to the product operator * . After these checks have been performed, the repair will be assembled as follows.
First, value4, value5 and buggyStm10 located at lines 5, 8, and 10 in Figure 5 , are replaced with: (1) the squared root of the currently selected integer upper bound value value4 ← sqrt(2147483647), (2) the negated integer upper bound value value5 ← -sqrt(2147483647), and (3) the program code statement that contains the previously detected integer overflow error buggyStm10 ← int result = data * data;. Second, the variables FileName, IO_bug and LineNumber located at lines 15-16 in Figure 5 are replaced with concrete values obtained during bug detection. Finally, note that: (1) other code repair patterns can be selected and used based on the format of the AST of the program buggy statement, (2) our technique can be easily generalized to more complex C code statements than the ones mentioned herein, and (3) each generated repair can easily be customized to fit to different types of integer overflow mitigation scenarios, i.e., error logging, etc.
Determine New Constraint System
Generate Code Repair
This step consists of putting together the final code repair(s) and saving them into a list in case multiple repairs are suggested. After the repair components have been inserted into the previously selected code repair pattern, INTREPAIR generates a C code repair which is syntactically correct, can be compiled and can be further on edited after insertion (if desired). Note, that INTREPAIR generates correct patches w.r.t. the correctness definition provided in Section 1, which essentially means that INTREPAIR re-checks the program after a patch was applied in order to determine if the bug was really removed, and the program behavior was not changed.
Implementation
We have implemented the approach presented in Section 3 in a prototype named INTREPAIR. It is an Eclipse [15] plugin based on Codan [23] . INTREPAIR consists of approx. 10 KLOC and is developed as an Eclipse plug-in mainly because: (1) the Eclipse CDT API can be easily reused, (2) a GUI is easily obtainable, and (3) the obtained tool can be used in both online (during code typing) and off-line (after finishing code typing) modes. Note that Codan [23] is used by INTREPAIR to construct the program CFG, analyze the program AST statements, and perform bottom-up traversals by using a C program statement visitor in order to construct SMT constraints. Three additional auxiliary tools are implemented as well to work with INTREPAIR.
The assembled repair generated in Section 3.5.8 is sent to the Eclipse language tool kit (LTK) API [17] based component of our engine, which will assemble the repaired code. The LTK component adds information on how to position the repair in the buggy program such that the integer overflow will not occur after the repair was inserted. In case multiple repairs have been generated, INTREPAIR saves these repairs in a list of repair candidates for the previously detected integer overflow. Finally, the repair which was selected by the programmer will be passed to the INTREPAIR repair insertion component, which will create two differential views (i.e., with the repair inserted in the file containing the bug and without).
Next, due to paper length constraints, we only briefly describe the three additional tools which we implemented and which offer support to INTREPAIR during program patching: (1) an Eclipse CDT projects generator tool which is used for generating Eclipse CDT compatible projects, (2) a source code refactoring tool based on the Eclipse LTK [17] , JFace [16] , and Eclipse CDT [15] , for inserting program repairs, and (3) a test case generator tool which can help to assess the accuracy of integer overflow detection using test cases. Figure 6 shows the INTREPAIR Graphics User Interface (GUI). First, the integer overflow triggers a bug marker depicted in the black bordered box with a yellow bug icon. It means that on the C statement an integer overflow error was detected. Second, by right clicking on this bug marker the user can start the code re-factoring wizard. The code re-factoring wizard is composed of two windows. The first window is used to make repair type decisions (currently only in-place repairs are available). The second window depicted in Figure 6 (in the background) contains a differential files view visualizing the differences between the original file containing the bug and the modified file with the selected repair inserted. This second window helps the developer to analyze the patch before it is applied. Finally, it is possible to navigate between these two windows and in case the programmer decides to insert the repair generated in Section 3.5 then this can be achieved by left-clicking on the Finish button.
Graphical User Interface in an IDE
EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of our experimental evaluation and address the following research questions (RQs): 
Evaluation Setup
We used these program as they contain all possible program control flows which may lead to an integer overflow and further, these help to assess previously known faults in a systematic way.
Synthesized Code. In addition, we build a benchmark with 50 synthesized programs with complex control flows and with a high number of code lines. In each synthesized program, the exact number of seeded integer overflows is known. The benchmark allows us to demonstrate that INT-REPAIR can scale efficiently to large and complex programs. The synthesis of programs is parameterized as follows: (1) the total number of function calls, (2) the number of loop iterations, and (3) each generated program contains exactly one true positive and a variable number of false positives, and the true positive should be located deep inside the program, i.e., several thousands of branches nested inside the program execution tree. Using these limits, we generate 50 programs ranging from 6 to 20 KLOC. The synthesis algorithm iterates through several loops in which it adds functions in the program which are calling each other. These functions contain a variable number of branches which are also counted until a certain depth is reached.
Statistics. Juliet test suite and the 50 programs of our benchmark. The programs contained in the CWE-190 contained on average: 56 satisfiable paths, 584 unsatisfiable program execution paths, and 5,800 program branches, which were counted during program analysis. In contrast, the programs contained in our own benchmark contained on average: 900 satisfiable paths, 14,000 unsatisfiable program execution paths, and 28,000 program branches, which were counted during the analysis of the programs.
User Study. We also performed a controlled experiment with 30 participants in which we assessed the efficiency of INTREPAIR during integer overflow repair. The used protocol is described in Section 4.6.
Experiment Setup. Experiments were conducted on a Dell desktop with an Intel CPU Q9550 @ 2.83GHz, 64-bit, 12GB RAM, Eclipse IDE Kepler and OpenSuse 13.1 OS.
Effectiveness (RQ1)
As our main test-bed we select 2,052 C programs contained in the NSA's Juliet test suites [49] and 50 programs from our customized benchmark.
Methodology. We prepare the 2,052 C programs in Juliet in order to be handled by INTREPAIR. Further, we generate 2,052 test cases which are used to dynamically assess if the detected integer overflow errors are detected at the correct source code location. For the automated generation of these test cases we used one of the tools presented in Section 3.6.
We do the same pre-process with the 50 programs from our own benchmark.
(1) We assess the effectiveness of integer overflow detection by running the generated test cases for all programs (including the 2,052 C programs in the Juliet test suite and 50 C programs contained in our benchmark) and checking the generated reports. More precisely, we checked whether each report describes an integer overflow reported at the expected location. (2) For those reports which are confirmed as true positives INTREPAIR inserts a suitable repair into the overflow site. (3) Then, INTREPAIR was run again in order to check if this was a true positive and if the fault was removed.
We point out that, for the assessed programs, INTREPAIR did not detect any false positives. Further, INTREPAIR is able to detect and repair all previously detected true positives present in the analyzed programs without repairing any false positives. Finally, note that the ground truth is that each of the 2,052 C programs contains one true positive and multiple false negatives and the same is true for the programs contained in our benchmark.
Results. According to our experiments, INTREPAIR is able to detect all integer overflows (2,052 overflows contained in the Juliet test suite and 50 in our benchmark) at the expected locations in the analyzed programs. After the repairs conducted by INTREPAIR, the integer overflow reports are no longer generated. This means that INTREPAIR is able to perfectly repair all integer overflows for the analyzed programs.
Bug Removal (RQ2)
In this section, we explain how the integer overflows are completely removed by INTREPAIR. Recall that INTREPAIR checks if a bug was completely removed after a repair was inserted in two operation modes.
Methodology. In this experiment, we use INTREPAIR's Manual Mode. In this mode, the user can again analyze the repaired program by manually restarting the static analysis. In case the symbolic analysis detects no other (or the previous fixed bug) integer overflow, then no bug report will be generated. This helps the programmer to conclude that the bug was completely removed and no new bug was inserted into the program.
Actually, we use INTREPAIR to re-analyze each patched program. For each of the repaired programs, we checked if after the program was repaired any new bug report was filed.
Results. After patching and subsequently reanalyzing each program, no new overflow reports are generated, meaning that the bugs are completely removed without inserting new ones. For all programs, the errors were successfully removed by inserting the repair at the correct location.
Performance (RQ3)
In this section, we evaluate the performance of INTREPAIR in three ways (1) the time INTREPAIR takes; (2) binary size blow-up, and (3) the runtime overhead caused by the overflow repair. Finally, we show that INTREPAIR has the potential to scale to large programs as well.
Static Analysis Time
The time that INTREPAIR spends in static analysis, i.e., static symbolic execution and overflow repair processes, is an important criterion to assess the usability of our tool. 6 Results. Table 3 depicts the average execution time over 10 runs for each of the benchmark programs grouped in three main categories based on their LOC. INTREPAIR handles all programs under 10 Min. (567 sec.) on average. Hence, we believe that INTREPAIR is time-effective and usable in practice.
Binary Size Blow-up.
We assessed the source code and binary blow-up by counting the increase in source code lines and in bytes for the programs before and after applying the repairs.
First, we compared the total number of lines contained in the source code against the number of lines of code which were added after inserting all the repairs into the 2,052 vulnerable programs. As already mentioned, the initial number of lines was 977.7 KLOC. After applying all repairs, we added in total around 10,045 LOC.
Results. INTREPAIR yields a binary blow-up of less than 0.56% in LOC. In our opinion, this represents an acceptable source code lines increase.
Execution Overhead.
We evaluated the runtime overhead introduced by INT-REPAIR by comparing the execution time of unrepaired programs against the one of the repaired programs.
Results. In our experiments, we recorded an average runtime overhead of 1.57%. Thus, the inserted repairs do not considerably influence the runtime overhead of the repaired program.
Correctness (RQ4)
We validate the correctness of our repairs by checking that our symbolic execution component generates semantically different code. In other words, we want to find out if the repairs can potentially influence the program behavior and the repair correctly removes the bug (see our patch correctness definition in Section 1 for more details).
To do so, we compare the generated SMT model before and after the repair. For this, INTREPAIR's symbolic execution component stores the SMT system which was used to trigger the bug report. Next, this constraint system is compared with the new SMT system which was generated after repair validation. This results in the following analysis process: 1) For all programs contained in our benchmark and the Juliet test suite, we stored the SMT system for each program and the node (i.e., source code line number and file name) where the bug is located. 2) We applied the repair to the detected integer overflow by automatically rewriting the program.
3) We re-run the symbolic analysis on the patched program and store the new SMT system. 4) We semantically checked each SMT system stored at step (2) and each SMT system collected at step (4) based on string comparison of the node with another node, where a node is a complete statement, e.g., x = p + 5. This enables INTREPAIR to detect the differences between these two systems. 5) We compare the SMT system differences and proceeded as follows: (1) if the new SMT system only reflects the semantics of the inserted repair: we report no program correctness violation, (2) otherwise, we reported that the program correctness will potentially be affected by inserting this repair.
We automatically compared in total 225K SMT models and all patched programs. These differ by up to five AST nodes and by less than three SMT constraints on average, respectively. Further, all checked SMT models differ only with respect to the repair semantics and no additional program semantics were introduced in the program due to the repairs.
Additionally, we performed the following evaluation process in order to increase the level of confidence w.r.t. repair correctness.
Re-check Patched Program. We re-run the symbolic analysis, after applying the repair, on each of the programs in order to see if there is a potential new integer overflow error or the old one is still present in the repaired program.
Check Syntactical Program Correctness. We recompiled (we used the GCC compiler) each of the programs to investigate if the repaired program is compilable and thus syntactically correct. The compiler reported no syntactical errors.
Results. The normal behavior of the repaired programs does not change after applying the repairs, thus program correctness is preserved.
User Study (RQ5)
In order to evaluate INTREPAIR's efficiency w.r.t. integer overflow repairing compared to manual repairing, we performed a user study with 30 graduate students (16 males and 14 females). They all had on average between 1-2 years of industry programming experience.
Methodology. The experiment was conducted with each participant individually at a single computer with an additional person in the room who overlooked the whole experiment. The computer used in our experiment was equipped with two versions of Eclipse CDT, i.e., one Eclipse version with INTREPAIR installed and the other Eclipse version without INTREPAIR installed. We split the 30 participants evenly in two groups 3 . We randomly selected three programs from our benchmark, and we told each participant of both groups to search for a single integer overflow in each of the three programs and to repair it. The participants were allowed to read and execute the program. A debugger was not available and no test case for executing the overflow was provided. Further, all participants had similar experience with the task at hand, particularly fault detection, as they had 1-2 years of experience as developers in a software company. Finally, in the case of manual debugging no test cases where prepared for simplicity reasons. The experiment supervisor assessed each bug detected manually by manual inspection after this was reported by the experiment participant. We measured the time needed for each participant to locate the bug and repair it and the success rate for each analyzed program after the participant decided that he/she was finished with all three programs at the end of their analysis. After the experiment, we asked each participant if (1) he/she would reuse INTREPAIR in his/her daily routine and if (2) he/she would recommend it to other peers. Each question could be answered with yes or no.
Results. (1) In total, the participants of Group 1 needed 6534 seconds (108 Min.) to repair the bugs in the experiment, whereas participants from Group 2 only needed 362 seconds (6 Min.) to repair them. That means, programmers using INTREPAIR in our experiment were over 18 times (6534/362) faster compared to relying on manual repair.
(2) We inspected the repairs inserted manually by Group 1 and those inserted by INTREPAIR. 41% of the manual repairs were correct, i.e., the integer overflow bugs were removed and no further vulnerabilities were introduced. By construction, all the repairs with the help of INTREPAIR were correct (see RQ2 for more details). Hence we conclude that INTREPAIR is more effective w.r.t. overflow repair than manual analysis.
(3) Out of the total participants of Group 2, 94% (14 participants) found INTREPAIR to be very useful and 87% (13 participants) would further recommend INTREPAIR to others.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity of our experiments and the limitations of INTREPAIR.
Threats to Validity
Internal validity depends on the correctness of our prototype implementation and may be affected by the evaluation setting and the execution of the conducted experiments. To mitigate this, we carefully tested our prototype by repeating the experiments ten times and by taking average performance values. To validate the correctness of our automatically generated patches, we re-ran the analysis on the program after patching and inspected each program patch manually in order to check for correctness.
External validity threats may derive from the selection of programs which we used in our evaluation. We validated our repairs on 2,052 programs and also on seeded programs having up to 20 KLOC contained in our, especially for this purpose designed, benchmark. In more complex applications, program repairs can dramatically increase the runtime overhead when, for example, these reside in hot code such as loops. Thus, different results could be obtained for different analyzed programs.
Construct validity threats may appear from the fact that our patches may introduce overhead or unwanted program behavior. We point out that our repairs are suggested only for code locations where previously an integer overflow was confirmed. Further, our experiments show that our patches do not harm performance in any significant way, do not change program behavior, are automatically validated, and are applicable only at previously confirmed bug locations.
Limitations
First, at this stage of development the used static symbolic analysis framework (Codan) supports a subset of the C/C++ programming language semantics. Thus currently only certain types of statement and function headers can be handled by INTREPAIR. Nevertheless, we do not consider this to be a major limitation, adding all C/C++ statement types and function headers can eliminate this. Investing sufficient time and manpower can address this limitation.
Second, INTREPAIR's implementation depends on program loop and recursion depth unrolling which incurs wellknown precision penalties for all symbolic execution-based techniques. These operations can introduce false positives due to loop unrolling and recursion depth. Note that INT-REPAIR does not produce false positives by design (i.e., each detected fault is a genuine one). Our static analysis is timeconsuming. Its accuracy and performance will affect INT-REPAIR's results. INTREPAIR does not have access to runtime information and a real environment is also not available. In order to deal with this limitation, INTREPAIR uses function stubs which can help to simulate the environment (interaction with third-party libraries). Note that loop unrolling and recursion depth have to be bounded when using symbolic execution-based approaches in general since we want to avoid the path explosion problem and thus infinite analysis time. We want to address this potential insufficiency by a prior analysis of program loops in order to derive loop invariants. Further, we want to extend the list of currently supported stub functions for the main C most used system libraries.
Third, complex program expressions cannot be handled due to limited support in the currently available open source state-of-the-art of SMT solvers for non-linear computations. Thus, we want to address this potential limitation by carefully providing SMT constraints which capture as good as possible the original program constraints and by experimenting with different SMT solvers.
Fourth, as INTREPAIR relies on static symbolic analysis of source code it has several limitations which are common to all static analysis techniques when comparing to dynamic analysis techniques such as the well-known path explosion problem. Note that static searching through the program paths is different than dynamic path analysis where program path coverage is driven by the provided program input. We addressed this by implementing in INTREPAIR different path exploration techniques in order to analyze first more error-prone paths.
Fifth, INTREPAIR's evaluation is based on the currently largest open source test suite for C/C++ programs, i.e., SA-MATE's Juliet test suite, due to the fact that it contains complex control flows and a large number of situations where integer overflow can occur. The programs contained in our benchmark are comparable with real-world programs. As a result, the findings of our evaluation do not necessarily reflect the behavior of INTREPAIR when applied to larger programs to some extent. However, we do not think that this limits the applicability of INTREPAIR, since our tool is highly scalable due to its configurable analysis. Further, we want to evaluate INTREPAIR on even larger programs as well.
Finally, we tested INTREPAIR in a controlled experiment with a restricted number of participants. For this reason our findings may differ from industrial settings where real development conditions are available. But we think that our tool can help to drastically cut down the time needed for bug detection and repair due to its usability and low intrusiveness. Finally, we want to evaluate INTREPAIR also in industry settings.
RELATED WORK
There is a large body of research work focusing on integer overflow detection: ARCHER [9] , UQBTng [53] , PREfast [28] , Rich [3] , SAGE [20] , CBMC [10] , IntScope [51] , Brick [7] , IntFinder [6] , SmartFuzz [37] , PREfix [39] , IntPatch [55] , IOC [14] , IntFlow [44] , SoupInt [50] , SIFT [24] , TAP [45] , Diode [46] , Indio [56] , Zhang et al. [54] , and IntEQ [48] . In contrast, only few approaches focus explicitly on integer overflow repairs: CIntFix [8] , SoupInt [24] , CodePhage [47] , TAP [45] , and SIFT [24] . Out of these approaches, only TAP [45] (technical report) and SIFT [24] first explicitly detect the integer overflow and then repair it. The other tools-which do not first confirm the bug existence-mostly blindly change the code in all error prone locations in the hope to avoid integer related problems. For example: (1) CIntFix [8] utilizes integers of infinite size with two's complement encoding in place of original bounded integers, and (2) AIC/CIT/RAO [11] relies on three code transformations: add integer cast (AIC), replace arithmetic operator (RAO), and change integer type (CIT) to change the program in order to avoid integer overflows. However, in most cases these tools are triggering high runtime overhead and have a considerable likelihood of changing program behavior.
SIFT [24] first detects the integer overflow (bug detection is based on Diode [46] ) and then generates an input filter to eliminate the bug at the binary level. Sift is a static input filter generation tool, which inserts input filters in the program binary for which the source code was previously manually annotated with source code annotations. Sift relies on tedious user source code annotations and cannot guarantee that no unwanted program behavior is introduced since the filters may remove only the integer overflows which these cover.
In the above-mentioned approaches, fault localization is performed before patch generation. In contrast, we combine fault localization and patch generation, and as a result, we obtain the capability of generating precise patches which remove the bug for various program inputs (bug detection is not program input independent) and at the exact location where the bug was detected upfront. For this purpose, we use SMT solving for bug localization. However, unlike INTREPAIR, SMT solving is not used for repair synthesis by TAP or Sift. As such, their bug removal process is bound to a limited number of test inputs to confirm that the bug was removed after the repair was inserted, which does not guarantee that the bug was really removed for all possible program inputs.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented INTREPAIR, a novel framework which provides comprehensive integer overflow detection, correct repair generation, and validation. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first static symbolic executionbased technique that combines detection, generation and validation of source code repairs for C programs. We applied INTREPAIR to 2,052 C programs (approx. 1 million LOC) and to 50 programs contained in our seeded benchmark, which includes programs that have up to 20 KLOC. Our experimental results show that INTREPAIR was able to effectively detect integer overflows and successfully repair them with source code patches. Our controlled experiment shows that INTREPAIR is 18 times more time-effective and has a higher repair success rate than manual repairs. Finally, we will make INTREPAIR available as open source upon paper acceptance.
